The $235m Desalination Judgment: Who was involved and who must provide answers?

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Ghana’s US$235 million arbitration award over the Teshie-Nungua Desalination Plant did not happen overnight. It is the product of decisions spanning more than 15 years, involving different governments, ministers, Ghana Water executives and private-sector actors.

Two arbitral awards issued on September 17, 2026 require Ghana Water Limited to pay approximately US$235 million, net of taxes, in termination payments, with interest accruing from April 1, 2026.

So, who must provide answers?

The original deal: Kweku Botwe and Alban Bagbin

The deal began in April 2010 when Befesa Desalination Development Ghana Limited submitted an unsolicited proposal to Ghana Water Company Limited for a plant capable of producing 60,000 cubic metres of water daily.

The GWCL Board approved the project agreement in August 2010, and the Water Purchase Agreement was concluded on February 25, 2011.

Kweku Botwe was then Acting Managing Director of Ghana Water. As head of the utility purchasing the water, his administration should be able to explain the technical and financial assessment behind the deal.

What projections were made about GWCL’s ability to pay? Who negotiated the tariff and capacity charges? What risks were presented to the board?

Alban Bagbin, now Speaker of Parliament, was Minister for Water Resources, Works and Housing when the agreement was concluded.

His ministry must also explain what due diligence was undertaken and what advice  government received before supporting a 25-year arrangement carrying substantial long-term financial obligations.

Goosie Tanoh and Befesa

Goosie Tanoh was legal adviser and consultant to Befesa and was present at the 2011 signing.

His account could help establish what happened on the investor’s side of the negotiating table.

Who proposed the capacity-payment structure? How were the tariff and risk allocation negotiated? What objections did Ghana’s representatives raise?

Tanoh’s involvement in the original transaction must, however, be distinguished from the termination and arbitration that occurred more than a decade later.

Carlos Cosín and other Befesa representatives involved in negotiating and executing the agreement can similarly help explain the commercial assumptions behind the deal.

Kwabena Duffuor, E.T. Mensah and Parliament

The Ministry of Finance became crucial when, under then Finance Minister Dr Kwabena Duffuor, it issued a Letter of Comfort in October 2011.

Parliament subsequently considered the US$110 million Water Purchase Agreement, government guarantee and tax and duty exemptions estimated at US$72.83 million.

What assessment did the Finance Ministry make of Ghana Water’s ability to meet its obligations? What was government’s estimated exposure if the utility could not pay?

And what did Parliament know about the potential long-term cost before approving the arrangement?

The problem becomes obvious

The plant was commissioned in 2015 when Collins Dauda was sector minister and G.K. Dovlo headed Ghana Water.

By November that year, Ghana Water was already reporting significant amounts owed to the operator.

That should have been an early warning.

When the Akufo-Addo administration took office in 2017, it inherited the agreement—but also inherited responsibility for dealing with its problems.

Dr Clifford Braimah, then Managing Director of Ghana Water, publicly acknowledged the financial difficulties. The plant was shut in 2018 as government sought to renegotiate the arrangement before operations later resumed.

This raises another question: what became of those renegotiations?

Were options such as restructuring the tariff, buying out the investors or acquiring an equity stake seriously pursued? Could the state have exited the arrangement then at a lower cost?

Ken Ofori-Atta, Amin Adam and Oppong Nkrumah

The Finance Ministry under Ken Ofori-Atta became increasingly important as government provided financial support to keep the arrangement going.

By 2024, the government’s own PPP report was recommending expedited renegotiation of the Water Purchase Agreement and consideration of government acquiring an equity stake.

Dr Mohammed Amin Adam was then Finance Minister, while Kojo Oppong Nkrumah headed the Works and Housing Ministry.

How far did those negotiations go? Was an acquisition priced? What prevented a restructuring before the administration left office?

These officials did not negotiate the original agreement, but they can explain why years of attempts to resolve it did not produce a lasting solution.

The final chapter: termination and US$235m

The Mahama administration inherited the problem again in January 2025. In October 2025, Ghana Water shut the plant amid unresolved contractual, maintenance and safety issues. The Water Purchase Agreement was subsequently terminated.

That decision is now critical.

Ghana Water Managing Director Adam Mutawakilu must help explain who authorised termination, what legal advice was received, whether officials knew the potential termination liability and what alternatives were considered.

Ghana Water also reportedly pursued a US$144.5 million counterclaim that was substantially unsuccessful. The basis for that claim deserves public explanation.

In March 2026, Works and Housing Minister Kenneth Gilbert Adjei disclosed that President Mahama had directed him, Finance Minister Dr Cassiel Ato Forson and Attorney-General Dr Dominic Ayine to negotiate with the owners.

Six months later came the US$235 million awards.

What happened?

How close were the parties to settlement? What was being demanded? Was there an opportunity to settle for less? Why did negotiations fail to prevent the final awards?

Publish the documents

This cannot simply become another NDC-versus-NPP argument.

The original agreement and sovereign guarantee were concluded under one administration. Another inherited the financial difficulties and spent years attempting renegotiation. A third inherited the problem, after which the agreement was terminated and the arbitration concluded.

Different officials therefore have different questions to answer.

Government should now consider publishing the 2011 Water Purchase Agreement, 2012 addendum, sovereign guarantee, Ghana Water board approvals, Finance Ministry Letter of Comfort, PURC tariff assessments, renegotiation proposals, termination notices and, where legally permissible, the arbitral awards.

The question is no longer simply who signed the deal?

It is also: Who negotiated its terms? Who approved the risks? Who failed to fix the problems when they became obvious? Who authorized termination and did they know it could leave Ghana facing a US$235 million bill?

Those are the answers the public deserves.

Source: citinewsroom

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